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CONTROLLABILITY AND PERCEPTUAL BIASES OF RISKS AND ABILITIES:
THE CASE OF AN F-16 COCKPIT
Shaul Shalvi¹, Roy Holland², Dafna Wolff³, Zohar Biton³,
Neta Harel³, Odelya Harpaz³, Moran Dishi³, and Ilana Ritov¹.
¹The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel, ²Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, ³The Academic College of
Tel Aviv-Jaffa.
This study investigated airmen’s susceptibility to unrealistic optimism biases based on the position of control in an
F-16 cockpit. Forty-seven airmen completed a questionnaire measuring their “I am above average effect” in regard
to their flight ability and judgment, “below average effect” regarding their risk-taking tendencies, and unrealistic
optimism about the likelihood that they would be involved in an aerial accident. The results support our main
hypotheses: airmen demonstrated biased perceptions on these scales. With regard to their flight ability, pilots were
more susceptible to bias than navigators. Contrary to our prediction, we did not find similar results regarding
invulnerability. We discuss these results in light of controllability literature.
assessed is ambiguous (i.e. describes a variety of
behaviors). The more ambiguous the trait, the more
can one attach different self-enhancing meanings to
it. Thus, when asked to compare himself to his peers,
one will do so on the base of that self-serving
definition causing the above-average effect. For
example, if one is asked to rate her height (a nonambiguous trait) in comparison to her peers she is
more likely to give a correct estimation than when
she is asked to rate her managerial ability (a more
ambiguous trait). In the latter comparison, one who
considers herself a communicative person might
define high managerial ability as being good
communication skills, whereas another might
consider herself as a charismatic leader and therefore
define a good manager in those terms. When asked to
rate their managerial ability in comparison to their
peers each one will use her own self serving
definition, which will put her at the top of the chart.

Risk is an unavoidable part of airmen’s life and
practice. Aviation psychology literature has paid
much attention to various factors that help us better
understand airmen’s tendencies to take in-flight risks.
Examples of influential factors are the situational
poor
assessment
of
deteriorating
weather
(Wiegmann, Goa & O’Hare, 2002), psychological
biases such as sunk cost (O’Hare & Wiegmann,
2003), and framing effects (O’Hare & Smitheram,
1995). Most of the research on this topic has focused
on civilian pilots. An exception to that trend was the
research by Sicard and colleagues (2003) that
compared the risk tendencies of commercial pilots
and French Naval Aviation pilots. They found the
latter to demonstrate higher risk tendencies than the
commercial pilots. The current research aims to
further explore the military domain using a unique
sample of Israeli airmen, namely F-16 pilots and
navigators. The main research question we address is
the extent to which differences in susceptibility to
perceptional biases regarding ability and risk-taking
tendencies exist between airmen in different positions
in the cockpit.

Similar findings were found by O’Hare (1990), who
reported on the above-average effect among airmen.
Civilian pilots ranked themselves above average on
flight skill and judgment (both positive ambiguous
traits) and below the average on in flight risk taking
(a negative ambiguous trait).

“I am above average” effect
When people are asked to evaluate their own abilities
and characteristics in comparison to their peers they
tend to rank themselves above the average. This
phenomenon has been documented as affecting a
wide range of self estimations, among them those
regarding health (Weinstein, 1980) and driving
ability (Svenson, 1981). Dunning, Meyerovitz &
Holzberg, (1989) demonstrated that people tend to
use this self enhancing assessment and consider
themselves to be above the group average when
considering positive traits and below the average
when considering negative ones. They further
showed that the mechanism underlying this
phenomenon is the extent to which the trait being

Based on these findings we hypothesized that (1a) in
comparison to their colleagues, respondents will
evaluate themselves as below the average on in-flight
risk taking, and (1b) above average on flight ability
and judgment.
Unrealistic optimism
Not only do people view themselves in unrealistic
positive ways as described above. Taylor and Brown
(1994) mention that they also “believe they have
greater control over environmental events than is
actually the case; and hold views of the future that
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the safety of both the crew and the aircraft. Although
navigators are knowledgeable about flying the
aircraft this is not their routine duty.

are more rosy than base-rate data can justify” (p.22).
These judgmental errors labeled “unrealistic
optimism” affect people’s predictions about different
life events. For example, students had self-enhancing
predictions about their chance of owning their own
house, getting a post-graduation job, getting a high
salary, not having a drinking problem, not getting
fired, etc. (Weinstein, 1980). Generalizing these
results to non-student population, Weinstein (1987)
found similar optimistic views among the general
population in New Jersey when asked about their
susceptibility to health problems in the future.

As mentioned above, controllability may affect the
extent to which one is biased in regard to one’s superior
abilities and invulnerability to risks. Derived from the
different extent of control that pilots and navigators
possess over the aircraft, we predicted differences in the
amount of bias they would demonstrate. Specifically,
we hypothesized that (3a) pilots will consider
themselves superior to their peers in flight ability and
judgment more than navigators; (3b) Pilots will show
higher levels of invulnerability than navigators.

Similar results were found among pilots, who
estimated their own chances of being involved in an
aerial accident to be lower than other pilots with
similar experience (Wichman & Ball, 1983; O’Hare,
1990).
The
Aeronautical
Risk
Judgment
Questionnaire (O’Hare, 1990) included the personal
invulnerability scale as a measure for this tendency.
Goh & Wiegmann (2001) demonstrated that pilots’
over confidence in their own skills was a strong
predictor for their risky behavior – the decision to
press on and fly into deteriorating weather
conditions. Accordingly, we predict that military
airmen will demonstrate unrealistic optimism with
regard to being involved in aerial accident.
Specifically, we hypothesized that (2) Respondents
will estimate their own likelihood of being involved in
an aerial accident to be lower than the likelihood of
their peers.

Method
Participants
Twenty-four Israeli Air Force F-16 pilots and twentyfour F-16 navigators, all of whom are active airmen
in their units, volunteered to participate in the current
research. Only male airmen participated in our
sample and their age ranged between 22 and 51
(M=29.51, SD=6.99). Over 90 percent of them had
more than 200 flight hours and over 30 percent had
flown for more than 1,000 hours. The majority, more
than 60 percent, had been flying for more than five
years.
Tools
We used a short Hebrew translated version of the
Aeronautical Risk Judgment Questionnaire (O’Hare,
1990). Background information questions included
age, experience as airman (both flight hours and year
of practice), and years of education.

Controllability and optimism bias
Perceived control over events or their outcome leads
to higher optimistic bias. A meta-analysis revealed
that across twenty-one studies control had strong
effect size (r=.49) on optimistic views regarding risk
perceptions (Klein & Helweg-Larsen, unpublished
manuscript. Cited by Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd,
2001). In an attempt to better understand whether this
optimistic view is based on people’s biased
underestimation of their own vulnerability or
overestimation regarding the vulnerability of those
they compare themselves to, Helweg-Larsen &
Shepperd (2001) reviewed existing literature on the
topic. They found that the sense of control over a
situation influences the estimation of one’s own
vulnerability more than the estimation regarding the
vulnerability of others.

Self Judgment of skill and in-flight judgment as well
as risk taking tendencies were measured on a seven
point Likert scale. Participants ranked their flight
ability and judgment in comparison to their peers
with similar experience as 1 (“below average”) to 7
(“above average”). We also added one comparison
that was not included in the original version of the
questionnaire. The airmen were asked to report on
their tendency to take in-flight risks in comparison to
their peers. Specifically, we asked: “In comparison to
pilots [navigators] with similar experience to yours,
what is the frequency in which you take in-flight
risks?” The same scale was used while this time 1
indicated “lower frequency” and 7 “high frequency”.

In a dual-seat F-16 cockpit the pilot and navigator
differ from each other in the level of control they
possess over the aircraft during a routine flight. The
pilot’s responsibilities include the actual operation of
the aircraft as well as taking necessary account for

Hazard Awareness was measured by asking the
participants to indicate the likelihood of each of the
following factors to cause an aviation accident. On a
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seven point scale ranging from 1 (very unlikely) to 7
(very likely), they ranked the likelihood of pilot’s
fatigue, flying into deteriorating weather, pilot’s
misjudgment, and disregarding flight regulations as
causing such an accident.

frequency of in-flight risk-taking to be lower (M=3.3,
SD=1.33) then their peers. They also evaluated their
flight ability (M=4.77, SD=1.27) and flight judgment
(M=5.26, SD=1.05) as superior to their colleagues,
p<.05 in all cases.

Personal Invulnerability was assessed by introducing
the same set of hazard awareness questions, this time
asking participants to indicate how likely is each of the
factors to cause an aviation accident in which they
would be involved. This series of questions later
enabled us to estimate the personal feeling of
invulnerability by comparing the personal likelihood
of being involved in each type of accident with the
general likelihood. Thus, a positive gap between the
two indicates that airmen feel invulnerable about their
own chances of being involved in such an accident in
comparison to it happening to someone else.

Table 1. rmen’s mean† perception of flight ability,
judgment, and in-flight risk taking

Risk taking
Flight
ability
Flight
judgment

Total
(n=47)

Pilots
(n=24)

Navigators
(n=23)

-.68**

-.67*

-.70*

1.0**

1.21**

.77**

1.49**

1.71**

1.26**

Significance level, *p<.05, ** p<0.01.
† Means in the table indicate a distance from the average
(4). Thus, a positive figure indicates an above average
estimation, whereas a negative one indicates a below
average estimation.

Procedure
Airmen were asked to fill in a battery of
questionnaires during their morning briefing. Those
who agreed to do so received the questionnaires and
were asked to return them as soon as they completed
filling them out. All returned them within 24 hours.
The experimenter asked the participants not to
discuss any of the questions presented to them with
their colleagues and indeed, all reported that they had
not done so. One navigator returned the completed
task within less than ten minutes, which was
extremely fast, thus indicating that he did not pay
sufficient attention to the scenarios about which they
were asked. His data were therefore excluded from
any further analysis. All participants were
fully debriefed and thanked after completion of
the questionnaire.

Our second hypothesis was also supported. A pairedsamples t-test (N=46, p<.01 in all comparisons)
revealed that airmen estimate the chances that they
will be involved in aerial accident to be lower then
the likelihood that such an accident will take place in
general across all four given reasons (a high score
indicates high chances of being involved in accident).
Specifically, they estimated their own chances of
being involved in an accident caused by pilots’
fatigue to be lower (M=3.8, SD=1.67) than the
chances that such an accident would happen in
general (M=5.0, SD=1.28). When asked about an
accident caused by flight into deteriorating weather a
similar pattern was revealed; they estimated their
own chances of being involved as lower (M=3.59,
SD=1.57) than the general chance of occurrence
(M=4.63, SD=1.48). Evaluating pilots’ misjudgment
as a cause for accident did not change this
invulnerability pattern: own chances of being
involved in such accident were estimated to be lower
(M=4.65, SD=1.63) than the general estimation of the
chance of such an accident occurring (M=5.63,
SD=1.39). Finally, participants evaluated their own
likelihood of being involved in an aerial accident
caused by pilots’ disregarding flight regulations to be
lower (M=3.43, SD=1.67) than the likelihood of such
an accident occurring in general (M=4.98, SD=1.29).
As can be seen in table 2, both pilots and navigators
estimated their likelihood of being involved in an
aerial accident to be lower than the general likelihood
of such an accident occurring.

Results
The results support our first hypothesis. A one-sample
t-test (N=47) with test value of 4 (indication average
on the scale) revealed that across the different
positions in the cockpit, airmen evaluated themselves
as taking less in-flight risk than their peers in terms of
their perceived frequency of making risky choices
(M=3.32, SD=1.39). As predicted, they also evaluated
their flight ability (M=5.0, SD=1.21) and flight
judgment (M=5.49, SD=.95) as superior to their
colleagues, p<.01 in all cases. As can be seen in table
1, this tendency was observed for both pilots and
navigators. Pilots evaluated themselves as less in-flight
risk-taking than their peers (M=3.33, SD=1.46). They
also evaluated their flight ability (M=5.21, SD=1.41)
and flight judgment (M=5.71, SD=.86) as superior to
their colleagues. Similarly, navigators evaluated their
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not differ from the navigators (M=1.02, SD=1.1), t
(44) = .889, p>.05.

Table 2. Airmen’s mean† invulnerability perception
Cause of
accident

Total

Pilots

Navigators

Pilots’ fatigue

1.2**

1.35**

1.04**

1.04**

1.43**

.65*

Flight into
deteriorating
weather
Pilots’
misjudgment
Disregarding
flight regulations

.98**

1.09*

.87*

1.54**

1.57**

1.52**

In order to further explore post-hoc comparisons between
pilots’ and navigators’ perceptions we calculated the
Pearson correlations between all measured variables.
Table 3 illustrates these correlations.
Table 3. Pearson correlations between measured
variables for pilots and navigators†

1. Age

Significance level, *p<.05, ** p<0.01.
† Means in the table represent the participants’ estimation
of their likelihood of being involved in an aerial accident
subtracted from their estimation of the likelihood that such
an accident will occur in general. Thus, a positive figure
indicates a feeling of invulnerability whereas a negative
one indicates a feeling of vulnerability.

2. Experience
(years)
3.Invulnerabilit
y
Index
4. Flightexpertise
index
5. Risk taking

Our third hypothesis predicted (3a) that airmen in a
high controllability position (pilots) will show higher
levels of bias regarding their superior flight skills (in
comparison to their peers) than airmen in a low
controllability position (navigators). In order to test
this hypothesis we computed a flight expertise index
to be the mean of the airmen’s responses to the two
questions measuring their flight ability and judgment
in comparison to their peers. This index ranged
between 1 (below average ability and judgment) to 7
(above average ability and judgment, the Cronbach’s
alpha of this index was 0.6. As predicted, pilots
demonstrated higher bias on the flight expertise index
(M=5.46, SD=.82) than navigators (M=5.02,
SD=.97), t (45) = 1.67, p=.05 (one-tailed).

1

2

3

4

5

-

.98*
*

.38‡

.20

-.22

.97*
*

-

.37

.20

-.17

.15

.10

-

-.12

.04

-.24

-.19

-.11

-

.54

-.15

-.13

.49*

.06

-

Significance level ‡p<.1 (marginal), * p<.05, **p<.01.
† The correlations presented in the lower left part of the
table are for pilots while those in the upper right side are
for navigators.

As can be seen in table 3, a different trend appears
for pilots and navigators in regard to the correlation
between perceived risk taking tendency and the
invulnerability index. Among pilots, as the level of
invulnerability to accident increases, the perception
of risk taking in comparison to others decreases (r =.49, p<.05). For navigators, this correlation is not
significant (p>.05). To put this differently, as a pilot
feels that his chances of been involved in aerial
accident are lower than the chances of a similar
accident occurring to other (i.e., higher
invulnerability bias) he also reports that he tends to
take less in-flight risks in comparison to his peers
(i.e., higher “below average” bias).

We further predicted (3b) that pilots will show a
higher level of invulnerability than navigators. In
order to test this hypothesis we computed an
Invulnerability Index to be the mean difference
between the estimation of one’s likelihood of being
involved in an accident subtracted from the general
likelihood of such an accident. The new index
therefore ranges between -6 (estimating own
likelihood of being involved in each type of accident
as much higher than the likelihood of such accident
to occur in general) to 6 (estimating own likelihood
of being involved in each type of accident as much
lower than the likelihood of such accident to occur in
general). Thus, a high score on that index indicates a
sense of invulnerability of the airman.

Discussion
The present research contributes to the aviation
decision making literature in two distinct ways: first,
by demonstrating the above average effect and
unrealistic optimism biases in military aviation, and
second, by discussing the airmen’s position in the
cockpit in terms of controllability and showing
differences in their susceptibility to such biases.

The results did not support our prediction: on the
invulnerability index, pilots (M=1.39, SD=1.44) did
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frequency and invulnerability. Note that low ranking
on the risk taking scale indicates a high level of bias
(i.e. one considers himself to have lower risk-taking
tendencies than his peers), whereas on the
invulnerability scale high bias is indicated by high
scores (i.e. one consider himself to be less vulnerable
than others to accidents). Hence, the negative
correlation indicates that the more one is biased in
regard to his risk-taking tendencies the more he is
biased about his level of invulnerability. Again, this
correlation between the biases exists only for airmen
in high controllability position.

The results fully supported our first hypothesis
predicting airmen’s tendency to rank themselves
above average on positive traits (flight ability and
flight judgment) and below average in negatives ones
(risk taking tendency). When asked to compare
themselves to their peers both pilots and navigators
demonstrated this biased perception. The second
hypothesis was also supported, showing that airmen
feel invulnerable with regard to their chances of
being involved in an aerial accident. Across four
different possible causes of such accidents
respondents, both pilots and navigators, ranked their
likelihood of being involved in an accident as lower
than the general likelihood of such an accident
occurring. In part, these findings replicate previous
findings in the civil aviation domain (O’Hare, 1990),
which are extended here to military aviation and to
different crew-members in the cockpit.

Klein & Kunda (1994) showed that people prefer
controlled risks over less dangerous uncontrolled
ones. Moreover, this tendency was evident when the
ability required for controlling the outcome was
conducive to the “I am above average” bias. They
conclude “this suggests that the belief that one’s
ability to control outcome is better than average plays
an important role in creating the preference for
controllable risks” (p.423). Intriguingly, our results
indicate that (only) for those in a position of control,
the lower they rank themselves below average on risk
taking (demonstrate high bias), the more they feel
invulnerable to being involved in accidents. Thus,
this sense of invulnerability might act as a mediator
in the tendency to prefer risky choices for those in a
position of control. As our analysis is correlational,
any causal interpretations should be considered with
appropriate caution. Having said that, the current
research demonstrates that position of control (in an
F-16 cockpit setting) had a different effect in regard
to the airmen’s susceptibility to unrealistic optimism
biases. Further experimental research should
investigate the role of unrealistic optimism as a
possible mediator between control position and the
tendency to prefer risky alternatives.

The results also supported our third hypothesis.
Previously, controllability has been found to affect
the extent to which people demonstrate above
average effect and unrealistic optimism. We
introduced the airman’s position in the cockpit as a
distinguishing factor of the controllability level they
possess. During flight a pilot has higher levels of
controllability over the aircraft than a navigator.
Therefore, we predicted that pilots will show higher
levels of bias with regard to their superior abilities (in
comparison to their peers) than navigators will. As
predicted, pilots ranked themselves higher above the
average concerning their flight expertise, more than
navigators did. It is important to note that both pilots’
and navigators’ comparison groups were their peers
who have similar experience; hence, the reported
difference is in the level of bias they showed and not
merely their ability estimation. We did not find
similar differences in the level of bias pilots and
navigators have on their optimistic perception of
accident invulnerability. A possible explanation for
this difference is that among the two biases flight
expertise was more directly related to the control
position in the cockpit than invulnerability was.

Conclusions
“Fatal aviation accidents are more often associated
with decision errors than minor accidents, which
tend to be associated with procedural execution
errors”
(Goh & Wiegmann, 2001, p. 360)

Furthermore, a post-hoc comparison revealed an
interesting difference between pilots and navigators.
The correlation between the “below average” risk
taking bias and the invulnerability unrealistic
optimism bias was significant only for pilots but not
for navigators. Earlier we suggested considering
airmen in controllability terms, where pilots are
considered to be higher in their in-flight
controllability level than navigators. As shown in
figure 1, for airmen high in controllability (pilots) but
not for those low in controllability (navigators) there
is a negative correlation between risk-taking

Airmen make judgmental mistakes; in that sense they
are just like anyone else. The above quotation reminds
us how costly these decision errors may be. Operating a
powerful air-vehicle in an ever changing, unpredictable
environment requires a high level of attention and
expertise. These highly trained experts face life risking
decisions as a daily routine. Although airmen are aware
of the risky aspects of their work they do demonstrate
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awareness or risky decision making? Final report,
FAA grant 2000-G010.
Sicard, B., Taillemite, J. P., Jouve, E., & Blin, O.
(2003). Risk propensity in commercial and military
pilots. Aviation, Space & Environmental Medicine,
74(8), 879-881.
Svenson, O. (1981). Are we less risky and more
skillful than our fellow driver? Acta Psychologica,
47, 143-148.
Taylor, S.E. & Brown, J.D. (1994). Positive
illusions and well being revisited: Separating fact
from fiction. Psychological Bulletin, 116(1), 21-27.
Weinstein, N.D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism
about future life events. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 39(5), 806-820.
Weinstein, N.D. (1987). Unrealistic optimism
about susceptibility to health problems: conclusions
from a community-wide sample. Journal of
Behavioral Medicine, 10(5), 481-500.
Wiegmann, D.A., Goa, J. & O’Hare, D. (2002).
The role of situation assessment and flight experience
in pilots’ decisions to continue visual flight rules into
adverse weather. Human Factors, 44(2),189-197.

perceptional biases regarding their superior ability and
low susceptibility to be involved in accidents. The
importance of the current research is encompassed in
presenting the higher manifestation of such biases
among those in position of control (F-16 pilots) when
compared to those who have less control over the
situation (F-16 navigators).
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